The bastinado.
Professor W. R. Smith regards this law of stripes as indicating a late date for Deuteronomy. He argues from the customs of the free Bedouins. But it is perilous to reason from the customs of the Bedouins to the punishments in vogue among a people who had lived some centuries in Egypt, where, as is well-known, the bastinado was in constant use. The sculptures at Beni-Hassan represent the very scene here described. We learn—
I. THAT IT IS THE FUNCTION OF CIVIL MAGISTRATES TO PUNISH CRIME. (Verses 1, 2.) They bear the sword for this purpose (Romans 14:4; 1 Peter 2:14). The modern humanitarian spirit tends to exalt the reformatory and preventive ends of punishment, at the expense of the retributive. That every effort should be put forth for the reformation of the criminal which the case admits of, we cordially allow. But the danger is, in these matters, that sentiment degenerate into sentimentalism. Crime deserves punishment, and on that ground alone, were there no other, ought to receive it. No theory can be satisfactory which loses sight of retribution, and makes reformation and prevention the all in all.
II. THAT PENALTIES OUGHT TO BE SUFFICIENTLY SEVERE. (Verse 2.) To be effective in early stages of civilization, penalties must be severe, prompt, and specific enough to be vividly conceived (cf. H. Spencer's 'Essays:' 'Prison Ethics'). The progress of society admits of the substitution of punishments appealing to a higher class of sensibilities. But even these ought adequately to express the measure of the criminal's desert. If Mr. Spencer were right, the slightest restraint compatible with the safety of the community, combined with compulsory self-support, would be punishment sufficient for the greatest crimes. The sense of justice in mankind rejects such ideas. Carlyle's teaching in 'Model Prisons' is healthier than this.
III. THAT PENALTIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED. (Verse 3.) It is difficult to believe that in our own country, at the beginning of this century, the theft of five shillings from the person was a crime punishable by death. Yet the statute-book bristled with enactments, of which, unhappily, this was not the worst. Such outrageous disproportion between crime and punishment must have robbed the law's sentences of most of their moral effect. Anomalies exist still, which it would be to any statesman's credit to endeavor to remove.
IV. THAT PENALTIES SHOULD NOT BE UNDULY DEGRADING, (Vet, 3.) Lest "thy brother should seem vile unto thee." The effect of excessive severity is to harden, degrade, dehumanize. It often drives the criminal to desperation. As a victim of the older criminal code expressed it, "A man's heart is taken from him, and there is given to him the heart of a beast." The tendency in modern feeling is toward the abolition of corporal punishments entirely, as degrading alike to him who administers them, and to those by whom they are endured.
Observe:
1. The profound idea on which the law rested. The body, part of human nature, and sharing its dignity as made in God's image.
2. The best laws may be unjustly and cruelly administered (2 Corinthians 11:24, 2 Corinthians 11:25).—J.O.